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INTRODUCTION
The year of 2010 marked the ninetieth anniversary of the ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment, in which women fought for the right to vote and be
treated as equals.1 Despite this achievement, women still fight for equal political,
social, and economic status several decades later. This fight for equality remains
especially prevalent in the workplace and mainly involves issues including worklife balance and salary disparities. While raising children is an important job for
both parents, society views women as the primary childcare providers, imposing
on working mothers the burden of balancing these responsibilities and societal
perceptions.2
Despite an increase of women in the workplace, some employers may be
reticent to grant necessary aid to working mothers, requiring these mothers to
choose between a career and motherhood. Mothers who cannot afford to forgo a
career or hire extra help must stretch themselves between their careers and their
children. These struggles bear a stark contrast to the hopes for true equality of the
women who advocated for the Nineteenth Amendment just ninety-two years ago.

1

With the right to vote, twenty-six million women voted in the 1920 presidential election.
ELEANOR CLIFT, FOUNDING SISTERS AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT 207 (2003).
2

This struggle between women’s roles existed in 1920 as evidenced by a 1920 ode, “To a Modern
Woman.” The ode states,
You’ve got the vote and you think it’s your mission,
To go to the polls like a bum politician
And while you are voting, your husband must roam,
For something to eat which he can’t find at home.
He’s getting dyspepsia and can’t work for pain,
Your children neglected, ask for you in vain.
While you make speeches from a broken soapbox.
Your family is wearing soiled clothes and torn socks.
Id. at 208.
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This article focuses on Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp.,3 an Ohio Supreme
Court decision affirming summary judgment against the discrimination claim of a
breastfeeding mother. Part I employs statistics to study the current status of
working women and the perceptions they face at work. Part II examines the
history of pregnancy discrimination. Part III evaluates Allen v. Totes/Isotoner in
comparison to other cases involving breastfeeding discrimination. Part IV
analyzes state and federal laws concerning breastfeeding laws and advises how
Ohio might approach this issue in the future. Finally, the article concludes by
considering what women can achieve through their right to vote and active
participation in politics and the workplace.
PART I: STATISTICS ON WOMEN IN THE WORKFORCE
As of 2008, the United States workforce consisted of about 68 million
women, or approximately 46.5% of the labor force.4 By 2016, women will likely
comprise 47% of the labor force.5 Women’s presence in the labor force will
likely continue to increase as the Baby Boomer generation, currently compose
40% of the labor force, retires.6

3

915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).

4

WOMEN’S BUREAU, Quick Stats on Women Workers, 2008,
http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/main.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2009). Even though women have an
increasing presence in the workplace, employers may still view women as mothers or future
mothers who will eventually leave. See SUSAN DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE
MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDERMINED ALL
WOMEN 208 (2004) (noting that stories about women who opted out implied that “having a career
and having small children were utterly incompatible” and that “if given a choice,” mothers with
careers “would quit in a heartbeat”).
5
6

DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 4 at 208.

See BARBARA J. BERG, SEXISM IN AMERICA: ALIVE, WELL, AND RUINING OUR FUTURE 190-91
(2009) (discussing workplace discrimination and gender bias and noting that the future “brain
drain” in the workplace with the retirement of the Baby Boomer generation indicates a need to
attract younger workers, both male and female, to prevent labor shortages and remain competitive
in today’s global economy).
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Besides representing nearly half of the labor force, women’s contributions
to their family’s income have increased from 26.6% in 1970 to 35.1% in 2005.7
Correspondingly, a decreasing share of households has only a singlebreadwinning husband, compared to an increasing number of single-breadwinning
wives.8 With the rising cost of living, two-income households have risen from
18,888 in 1967 to 33,380 in 2005.9
Most (currently, 71%) of these working women have children, which is an
increase from 47% in 1975.10 Working women whose children are often over the
age of six11 or who are unmarried are more likely to be a part of the labor force.12
Given the high percentage of women in the workforce, employers cannot afford to
have women with minor children leave the labor force.13 With the rising cost of
living, neither can two-income household afford to lose women’s income.
Further, the general public bears an interest in women’ continued employment;
otherwise, the burden would likely shift to the government to provide benefits like
Medicare and welfare to families in need.
PART II: HISTORY OF PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
Although the statistics indicate that women have an increased presence in
the work force, their involvement has gradually shifted over time. Colonial
7

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Contribution of Wives’ Earnings to Family Income, 1970-2005
(2006), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-table24-2007.pdf.
8

See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Married-Couple Families by Number and Relationship of
Earners, 1967-2005, (2006), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-table23-2007.pdf (showing that in 1967,
15,429 husbands were the family’s sole breadwinner while in 2005, only 10,603 husbands were
the family’s sole breadwinner).
9

Id.

10

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (2009),
http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-intro-2009.pdf.
11

Id.

12

Id. In 2008, 76% of unmarried women with children participated in the workforce compared to
only 69% of married women with children. Id.
13

See BERG, supra note 6, at 190-91 (noting that the retirement of Baby Boomers could create a
labor shortage and a brain drain in various fields).
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women worked in the home, and their work was critical to the family’s survival;
over time, however, the nature of industries changed.14 During the industrial era,
men’s work shifted from farming to industry, and families moved from the
countryside to the city.15 Among families who could afford the lifestyle, women
performed less housework and focused more on the “product” needed to fuel the
industrial era: children.16 Society, as a result, began to perceive women as the
family’s moral compass, rather than a contributor to the family’s survival.17 This
shift in the nature of women’s work, unfortunately, did not correspond with an
opposing shift in women’s societal status,18 as it was common, for example, for
fathers to prefer male children.19
This societal perception persisted despite some pioneering women who
bucked conventional trends by working.20 Society, however, deemed married
working women as oddities.21 When World War II began, the government
recruited women to work in factories to inspect weapons and their quality, a
crucial factor in the war effort.22 Many of these women worked jobs formerly
14

GAIL COLLINS, WHEN EVERYTHING CHANGED: THE AMAZING JOURNEY OF AMERICAN WOMEN
FROM 1960 TO PRESENT 4 (2009).
15

Id. at 4-5.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 5.

18

Id.

19

LORI D. GINZBERG, ELIZABETH CADY STANTON: AN AMERICAN LIFE 22 (2009) (noting that
although his daughter’s abilities pleased him, Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s father still stated, “Ah,
you should have been a boy!”).
20

CLIFT, supra note 1, at 15-16 (Susan B. Anthony was a schoolteacher); COLLINS, supra note 14,
at 21-22, 25-26 (noting that one woman pursued a career in the law, and another woman pursued a
career in advertising). Although those women discussed by Collins held non-traditional forms of
employment, they still endured discrimination regarding their abilities. Id.
21

See COLLINS, supra note 14, at 99 (noting that middle class America’s benevolence to working
women appeared to be limited to women who were young and single).
22

BERG, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that about six million women were recruited into World War
II’s labor force); COLLINS, supra note 14, at 97-98.
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reserved for men.23 After World War II ended, employers, as well as society in
general, expected women to relinquish these jobs to returning soldiers and return
to former traditional roles.24 Two factors, however, thwarted the complete redomestication of American women: 1) women’s desire to participate in the labor
force, and 2) the American industry’s high rate of exportation of consumer goods
to the world.25
Nonetheless, women who remained in the workforce still faced
difficulties. First, employers openly discriminated against women. A business
with a job opening could place a newspaper ad that read: “Help wanted – Men”
or “Help wanted – Women” without consequence.26 While teaching and nursing
proved to be among the few professions open to women,27 these career limitations
often arose from concerns about a woman’s health or concerns relating to
pregnancy.28

23

COLLINS, supra note 14, at 99 (“Darling – you are now the husband of a career woman.”); see
BERG, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that eighty percent of women in the labor force during World
War II “wanted to stay on the job even after the men returned”).
24

BERG, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that most women in the aircraft, electric, and automotive
industries lost their jobs after World War II ended and that many companies restored their policies
of “refusing to hire married women”).
25

COLLINS, supra note 14, at 98-99 (noting that although Americans comprised only six percent
of the global population, they produced about half of the world’s goods during the 1950s).
26

BERG, supra note 6, at 23. Even recourse through the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (“EEOC”) was met with indifference in the 1960s. Id. The EEOC wanted to rid
newspapers of racial discrimination but allowed gender discrimination to continue due to a desire
to maintain the status quo. Id.
27

COLLINS, supra note 14, at 102. Although access to a certain field is usually not the issue
nowadays, lower salaries due to a high percentage of women are an issue. See BERG, supra note
6, at 201 (discussing that certain professions have become feminized which has caused these fields
to have lower salaries from what they once paid like veterinarians).
28

COLLINS, supra note 14 at 102. For example, Lorena Weeks was denied a switchman’s job at
Southern Bell based on a state rule that barred women from lifting over thirty pounds. Id. at 8990. The job required her to use a piece of equipment that exceeded the state rule’s weight limit.
Id. at 90. She later sued and won. Id.
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When oral contraceptives became more readily available, the minimized
fear of pregnancy allowed women to pursue other careers.29 However, schools,
employers, and fellow employees still hindered women’s admission into maledominated arenas,30 and women who succeeded in obtaining employment in
male-dominated professions often found themselves relegated to positions
“suitable” for women.31
Women working in “male-dominated” fields also faced discrimination in
salary, as they did not enjoy the pay of their male counterparts,32 and some tried
to seek relief through legal action with mixed results.33 The Obama
administration addressed issues raised in the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. decision, including the statute of limitations issue
under Title VII, through the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.34
A.

Equal Protection

Among the unique challenges facing women that remain are the more
subtle forms of pregnant discrimination. Women’s early courtroom victories
tended to focus on general gender discrimination matters, rather than
discrimination based on pregnancy.35 Pregnancy became a focus of reform when
29

Id. at 102.

30

FRED STREBEIGH, EQUAL: WOMEN RESHAPE AMERICAN LAW 36 (2009). Dean Erwin Griswold
of Harvard Law School asked admitted female students, “What each was doing in law school,
occupying a seat that could have been held by a man?” Id.
31

Id. at 152-58. Women who sought employment at law firms during the 1960s likely received
hints to work in specialties like trusts and estates rather than litigation. Id. at 153, 157.
32

COLLINS, supra note 14, at 102.

33

See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 619 (2007), superseded by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5(2009)(determining that the statute of
limitations for pay discrimination under Title VII had run on the plaintiff’s claims and she could
not recover lost wages under that act).
34
35

Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).

See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (determining that the “differential
treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services” only to achieve “administrative
convenience violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it required female
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women decided to challenge the government’s and most employers’ policy of
treating pregnancy as a voluntary condition not coverable for insurance or
disability purposes.36 Several legal cases provide instruction on this trend.
1.

Geduldig v. Aiello37

In Geduldig, several women challenged the provision of California’s
disability insurance system barring coverage of “certain disabilities resulting from
pregnancy.”38 Although the district court held the provision unconstitutional
because it violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court reversed.39
Citing a previous California Court of Appeals’ decision on insurance
statutes, the Supreme Court designated three of the four cases as moot, and for the
remaining plaintiff, framed the issue to be whether the program “invidiously
discriminates . . . by not paying insurance benefits for disabilities” arising from
pregnancy and childbirth.40 The Court determined that excluding normal
pregnancies from disabilities did not amount to “invidious discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause” because California declined to insure all possible

service members to prove their husbands’ dependency). This case, however, only achieved a
plurality regarding whether gender discrimination should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny
standard. See STREBEIGH, supra note 30, at 57-61, 76.
36

STREBEIGH, supra note 30, at 82-83. Sally Armendariz’s car accident caused her miscarriage.
Id. at 82. Her insurance program denied her request, and the appeals board also denied her claim.
Id. The referee told her that “unlike most disabilities becoming pregnancy was voluntary” and
under the law, he had no choice but to reject these claims. Id. at 83.
37

417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat.
2076, as recognized in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669
(1983).
38

Id. at 486.

39

Id. at 490. The district court found the insurance program to be irrational because it paid for a
voluntary disability arising from plastic surgery but excluded an involuntary disability arising
from a miscarriage after a car crash. STREBEIGH, supra note 30, at 94.
40

Id. at 490-92 (noting that the California case construing the statute was Rentzer v.
Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604 (1973) and that the disabilities of three
plaintiffs’ merited benefits under this case due to arising in abnormal pregnancies).
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risks.41 The Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause did “not require that a
State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking
the problem at all.”42 Because no evidence existed that the program’s risk
selection “discriminated against any definable group or class in terms of the
aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program,” the
remaining discrimination claim did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.43 The
program categorized possible recipients as “pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons,” so no discrimination occurred because the non-pregnant group included
both sexes.44
B.

Title VII

Title VII is the employment discrimination section of the Civil Rights Act.
The original version did not address sex discrimination; rather, it focused its
attention on discrimination “based on ‘race, color, religion, or national origin.’”45
Political maneuvering caused sex to be added to the bill, which was later enacted
in 1964.46

41

Id. at 494.

42

Id. at 495.

43

Id. at 496. “There is no risk for which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is
no risk from which women are protected and men are not.” Id. at 496-97.
44

Id. at 497 n.20. In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that the “dissimilar treatment of men
and women, on the basis of physical characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably
constitute[d] sex discrimination.” Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In response, Justice Stevens
stated that the program “merely remove[d] one physical condition–pregnancy–from the list of
compensable disabilities” Id. at 497 n.20 (majority opinion).
45
46

STREBEIGH, supra note 30, at 111-12.

Id. at 112-14. Representative Smith of Virginia, though he was an Equal Rights Amendment
supporter, proposed the additional language in the hopes of killing the bill. Id. The language was
included in the bill with a vote of 168 to 133. Id. The language’s supporters were a motley crew
of politicians including women, Republican supporters of women’s rights, and Southern
Democrats who wanted the bill to fail. Id. at 113. Many of these politicians then voted against the
amended bill. Id. at 114.
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General Electric v. Gilbert47

The next major pregnancy discrimination case arose after Title VII’s
enactment. In Gilbert, General Electric required its pregnant female employees to
take a mandatory, uncompensated leave period before giving birth.48 The
plaintiffs sought and were denied disability benefits for this time period and filed
a Title VII claim with the EEOC.49 The district court found General Electric
violated Title VII by excluding pregnancy disabilities, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.50
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. The Court noted that Congress
had not incorporated prior discrimination concepts into Title VII and that the
Court’s decisions were its best resource for interpreting Title VII.51 The Court
thought that Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause were “not wholly
dissimilar” in context, and applied Geduldig to the case at hand.52 Since “the
concept of ‘discrimination’…was well known” when Title VII was enacted, the
Court refused to infer more from Congress’s language and determined that
General Electric’s disability benefits plan did not violate Title VII.53

47

429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 92 Stat.
2076, as recognized Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
48

Id. at 128-29. After these women gave birth, they had to wait six weeks before they could
return to their jobs. Id. at 150 n.1 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
49

Id. at 128-29 (majority opinion).

50

Id. at 130-31. The Fourth Circuit initially declined to decide General Electric’s appeal until
after the Supreme Court made a decision on the Liberty Mutual case. STREBEIGH, supra note 30,
at 123-24. The parties, however, petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case and then the
Fourth Circuit rendered a decision. STREBEIGH, supra note 30 at 124. The Fourth Circuit did not
follow Geduldig because it involved the Equal Protection Clause not Title VII. STREBEIGH, supra
note 30 at 131.
51

Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 133.

52

Id. at 133, 137. The Court also examined the conflicting EEOC guidelines but they provided
little guidance. Id. at 141-45.
53

Id. at 145-46.
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Both Justices Stevens and Brennan dissented from the opinion. Justice
Brennan believed that General Electric’s employment practices, the programs allinclusive design, the role of working women, and “the EEOC’s construction of
sex discrimination” was in line with Title VII’s goal “to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and
devices which have fostered [sexually] stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of women.54 Justice Stevens believed Geduldig to be inapplicable,
stating that the case at hand only involved a question of simple statutory
construction.55 He concluded that General Electric’s rule discriminated based on
sex and he would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s decision.56
C.

Title VII Amended: Pregnancy Discrimination Act

In response to the General Electric decision, Congress amended Title VII
with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), which states:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work, and nothing
in section 703(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit
otherwise.57
The Act’s purpose was “to clarify Congress’ intent to include
discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions in the
prohibition against sex discrimination and employment.”58 Congress clarified that
the General Electric majority did not correctly interpret Title VII by denying
54

Id. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

55

Id. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

56

Id. at 161-62.

57

92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).

58

H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4750.
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pregnant women its protection.59 Indeed, this protection against discrimination
would “extend[] to the whole range of matters concerning the child-bearing
process,” for women who were “pregnant, bearing a child, or [had] a related
medical condition.”60 Congress, however, neglected to define the “related
medical conditions” included under the PDA.
1.

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC61

In Newport News, the Supreme Court addressed an employer’s insurance
plan, which covered male and female employees in the same manner except for
when dealing with the issue of pregnancy, under the PDA. Male employees’
pregnant spouses received less hospital coverage than pregnant female employees
with spouses. A male employee sued, alleging that the plan was discriminatory,
but the district court found the plan lawful.62 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding
that a disparity in coverage existed between male and female employees, which
violated the PDA.63 Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court considered
whether the PDA’s enactment overturned General Electric’s holding and test for
discrimination.64
Examining the PDA’s legislative history and noting that many PDA
proponents felt that the Supreme Court had incorrectly interpreted congressional
intent, the Court analyzed the plaintiff’s claim against the backdrop “that
Congress had always intended to protect all individuals from sex discrimination
in employment — including but not limited to pregnant women workers.”65
Since the PDA made clear that discrimination based on pregnancy under
Title VII is sex discrimination and “the sex of the spouse is always the opposite of
59

Id.

60

Id. at 5, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4753.

61

462 U.S. 669 (1983).

62

Id. at 674.

63

Id. at 675.

64

Id. at 676.

65

Id. at 678-79, 681.
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the sex of the employee,” the Court concluded that discrimination against female
spouses regarding fringe benefits would qualify as discrimination against male
employees.66 As a result, the plan’s pregnancy limitation violated Title VII by
discriminating against the company’s male employees.67
The dissent felt that the Court’s analysis deviated from the PDA’s plain
language and legislative history applied to employees’ pregnancies rather than
their spouses.68 The dissent reasoned that General Electric still applied because
the PDA’s intent was to treat pregnant employees the same, and employees’
spouses were not within the congressional intent of the PDA.69
2.

Other Cases Construing the PDA

Despite the Newport News decision, courts often take a narrow view of the
PDA when plaintiffs attempt to recover for discrimination arising out of their
pregnancies.
i.

Maldonado v. U.S. Bank70

In Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, a provisional, part-time bank teller,
discharged after informing her boss about her pregnancy, sued her employer.71
The district court granted the employer summary judgment; however, the Seventh
Circuit reversed.72 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit discussed the intent of Title
66

Id. at 684.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 686-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

69

Id. at 690-95.

70

186 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 1999).

71

Id. at 761. The plaintiff interviewed for the part-time teller position on February 10th and
learned that she was pregnant three days later. Id. at 764. The plaintiff began her training on
February 20th, and as part of her training she received an employee manual that noted she was a
provisional employee for the first three months of her job and that employers were eligible for
pregnancy leave after one year of service. Id. While still in training, she informed her employer
approximately two weeks later that she was pregnant and was subsequently discharged. Id.
72

Id. at 761-62.
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VII and the PDA, noting that a prevailing party “must show that she was treated
differently because of her pregnancy,” which could be done directly or
indirectly.73 The employer did not dispute that it discharged the plaintiff because
of her pregnancy, but asserted that it discharged the plaintiff due to an anticipated
diminishment in her performance and anticipated unavailability due to her
medical condition.74
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the PDA allowed women to make
independent choices but the PDA “was not designed to handcuff employers by
forcing them to wait until an employee’s pregnancy cause[d] a special economic
disadvantage.”75 In other words, the PDA did not create an “artificial divide”
between pregnancy and secondary effects affecting job performance. Thus, an
employer could, in limited circumstances predict a pregnant employee’s
disruptive extra needs, such as breaks and act proportionately to such projections
if “it has a good faith basis supported by sufficiently strong evidence, that the
normal inconveniences of an employee’s pregnancy will require special
treatment.”76 The Seventh Circuit, while acknowledging that “an employer can
dismiss an employee for excessive absenteeism, even if the absences were a direct
result of the employee’s pregnancy[,]”noted that the employer had to offer proof
of such.77 The employer in Maldonado did not present any such evidence.78
Based on the factual record, the Seventh Circuit concluded that summary
judgment was inappropriate, noted that “[t]he PDA makes it unlawful for an
employer to assume that pregnant women will be less productive than other
employees,” and indicated the circumstances in which an employer may discharge
an employee based on bona fide occupational qualifications if it has a good faith
basis that is “supported by sufficiently strong evidence.”79
73

Id. at 763 (quotation omitted).

74

Id. at 766.

75

Id. at 767.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 767-68.

79

Id. at 767-69.
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Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center80

ii.

In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the plaintiff sued her
employer under Title VII and the PDA for failing to cover her fertility treatments
in her medical benefits plan.81 The district court granted the employer summary
judgment. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit found that the phrase “related medical
conditions did not contemplate conditions beyond actual pregnancy and
childbirth; additionally, the EEOC guidelines did not refer to infertility, which
strengthened the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning.82 The court held that plaintiff’s
infertility went beyond the PDA’s scope and affirmed the employer’s denial of
coverage.83
iii.

Fleming v. Ayers & Associates84

Similarly, in Fleming v. Ayers & Associates, the Sixth Circuit considered
whether “related conditions” extend to pregnancy complications suffered by the
child.85 Plaintiff’s child was born prematurely and suffered from hydrocephalus,
which resulted in an extended hospital stay for the child.86 After the plaintiff’s
child was released from the hospital, the plaintiff obtained a job at a nursing
home, which was later revoked upon the employer’s determination of the

80

95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).

81

Id. at 676.

82

Id. at 679-80.

83

Id. at 680. The court distinguished this case from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Johnson
Controls because potential pregnancy was sex related while infertility could affect both genders.
Id.
84

948 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1991).

85

Id.

86

Id. at 995. Hydrocephalus causes accumulation of “cerebrospinal fluid within the brain
resulting from developmental anomalies.” Id. at 995 n.1.
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associated insurance costs.87 The district court denied her Title VII claims but
determined that the employer had violated ERISA.88
The Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiff failed to establish a link between
her employer’s decision and her gender or pregnancy, as the PDA referred to
pregnant women’s conditions, not their offspring’s,89 even if the latter was
“present at birth.”90 The Sixth Circuit determined that (1) the PDA did not
encompass adverse employment actions due to a child’s medical condition merely
because that condition existed at birth and (2) the plaintiff’s failure to show that
the employer’s decision was related to gender as a dependent’s medical expenses
were not gender specific.91
iv.

Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union92

In Abraham v. Graphic Arts International, the plaintiff informed her
employer of her pregnancy and took maternity leave from her position as an
administrative assistant.93 She received no definite answer regarding leave before
giving birth.94 Upon her return, she learned of her termination.95 The EEOC

87

Id. at 995-96.

88

Id. at 996. The district court requested that the parties address sua sponte “the applicability of
ERISA section 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, to this case.” Id. While the court was taking the matter
under advisement, the plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint and add an ERISA claim. Id.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court held that the employer violated
ERISA because it had discriminated against the plaintiff “because of her expected use of employee
benefits.” Id.
89

Id. at 996-97. The employer’s reasons for her treatment involved her performance and high
insurance costs. Id. at 996.
90

Id.

91

Id.

92

660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

93

Id. at 813.

94

Id.

95

Id.
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issued her a right-to-sue letter, but the district court granted summary judgment in
favor of her employer.96
The D.C. Circuit reversed, determining that the plaintiff had made out a
prima facie case for trial.97 Additionally, the court noted that an employer may
not consider the employee’s gender or rely on a unique characteristic (i.e.
pregnancy) attributable to only one sex in the decision to discharge.98 Because
neither the union’s leave policies nor the Department of Labor contract applied to
the plaintiff, the court found that the policy conflicted with Title VII.99 The court
viewed the leave policies as “portend[ing] a drastic effect on women employees
of childbearing age an impact no male would ever encounter.”100
v.

In re Carnegie Center Associates101

The case regarding In re Carnegie Center Associates, involves a situation
in which the plaintiff’s employers faltered financially during her maternity leave
and eliminated her secretarial position.102 She sued, alleging discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, and marital status; the district court, however, concluded
that the company eliminated her position due to her absence and her lack of
qualifications (rather than race, gender, pregnancy) and that she did not qualify
for the other available positions.103
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered whether absence based on
maternity leave qualifies as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for

96

Id. at 813-14.

97

Id. at 815-16.

98

Id at 817.

99

Id. 818-19. The Department of Labor contract only allowed for ten days of vacation and ten
days of leave. Id.
100

Id. at 819.

101

129 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1997).

102

Id.

103

Id. at 294.
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termination.104 The court citing a Seventh Circuit’s decision, ruled that the PDA
requires an employer to ignore the pregnancy, but not the pregnancy-related
absence caused by the pregnancy unless it would also ignore that of other
employees.105 The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff’s absence (along
with the company’s economic woes) led to her termination.106 Most importantly,
the court declined to find that discharges based on maternity leave absences were
per se violations of the PDA.107
PART III: ALLEN V. TOTES/ISOTONER CORP. AND RELATED CASES
A.

Ohio’s Statutory Context

The aforementioned line of cases provide context to one subsidiary issue
to the described concerns facing working mothers — workplace breastfeeding
policies. Partly due to the singularity of the issue, legal authority on the matter is
sparse. Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., the Ohio case that is the subject of this
article, provides a reference for analyzing this matter. Ohio’s lone breastfeeding
statute establishes mothers’ rights to breastfeed in public, but does not address an
employee’s rights specifically.108 As a result, Allen brought her suit under Ohio’s
version of the PDA.109

104

Id.

105

Id. at 296 (construing Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994)).

106

Id.

107

Id. at 297.

108

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3781.55. This statute allows mothers to breastfeed “in any location
of a place of public accommodation wherein the mother otherwise is permitted.” Id.; see OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01 (defining places of public accommodation).
109

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112 et. seq. (discussing unlawful discrimination); OHIO ADMIN.
CODE § 4112-5 et seq. (discussing discrimination); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4112-5-05 (discussing
sex discrimination); Allen, 915 N.E.2d 622.
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Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp.

Plaintiff Allen was a temporary probationary employee of the
Totes/Isotoner Corporation.110 Allen – mother of a then-five month old son –
suffered from significant discomfort when unable to pump breast milk during
work hours.111 Allen began taking unauthorized breaks and requested
accommodations.112 Her superior decided to terminate her.113 Allen sued under
Ohio’s PDA, alleging that her employer discriminated against her based on her
choice to breastfeed her child.114 The Court of Common Pleas granted summary
judgment for the employer, finding that lactation discrimination is not pregnancy
discrimination, did not violate state public policy, and did not constitute disability
discrimination.115 The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed.116
The Ohio Supreme Court also affirmed, citing Allen’s unauthorized breaks
as the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination.117 In affirming
the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Ohio Supreme Court did not reach the issue of
whether breastfeeding discrimination was contemplated by Ohio’s employment
discrimination statute.118
Justice O’Connor of the Ohio Supreme Court concurred in judgment
only.
Justice O’Connor agreed that Allen had not developed a record that
would survive summary judgment, but believed that the trial and appellate courts
had “erroneously applied inapposite federal precedent” when analyzing Allen’s
119

110

Allen, 915 N.E.2d 622 (Ohio 2009).

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id.

116

Id. at 624.

117

See id.

118

Id.

119

Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment only).
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claims and that the court should clarify the law.120 Justice O’Connor argued that
breastfeeding was within the employment discrimination statute’s scope and that
the statute would therefore bar discrimination based on that action.121 The PDA,
she maintained, made clear that pregnancy discrimination was sex discrimination
and the employer must act neutrally toward a pregnant employee before, during,
and after pregnancy.122 Justice O’Connor distinguished a Sixth Circuit case cited
by the majority by noting that it involved discrimination based on public
accommodation, not employment discrimination.123
Justice O’Conner declined to use other federal courts’ post-Gilbert
rationales because Ohio’s legislative intent was to reject Gilbert.124 Justice
O’Connor resolved that the trial court’s conclusion that lactation was related to
breastfeeding as opposed to pregnancy was “curious and inaccurate.”125 Justice O’
Connor further suggested that the workplace rule on pumping breast milk may
treat lactating women disparately by restricting them to pumping breast milk only
at lunch, but not others who needed to tend to bodily functions.126 Nonetheless,
Justice O’Connor affirmed the summary judgment ruling.127 Justice O’Connor
agreed that Allen’s unauthorized breaks and the lack of evidence that the
employer implicitly ratified other employees’ circumvention of the break rules.128
The dissent believed that the majority avoided clarifying whether the Ohio
General Assembly intended to create a cause of action for discrimination based on
120

Id. at 625.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 628.

123

Id. at 628-29.

124

Id. at 629.

125

Id. at 630.

126

Id.

127

Id. at 631.

128

Id. Justice O’Connor, however, refused to hold that pregnancy and lactation were disabilities
because Allen had not shown how she was disabled. Id. at 631. Additionally, allowing her claim
to proceed under a disability analysis would revive paternalistic attitudes towards women. Id. at
632.
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the aftereffects of pregnancy.129 The dissent pointed to the lower court’s failure to
explore the differences between Allen’s unauthorized breaks and that of other
employees or the number of the latter.130 The dissent would have held that
lactation discrimination was employment discrimination and that Allen’s case
should proceed to trial.131
C.

Other Cases

The Allen decision is consistent with other cases decided in the United
States, as many courts have similarly concluded that the plaintiff either failed to
make a prima facie case of discrimination or that Congress did not contemplate
breastfeeding as protected from discrimination.132
1.

McNill v. New York City Dept. of Correction133

In McNill v. New York City Department of Correction, the plaintiff gave
birth to a son who suffered from a cleft palate and lip.134 Although she was
medically cleared to return to work after her maternity leave, she had missed work
numerous times to breastfeed her son until his surgery.135 Her employer

129
130
131

Id. at 632 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 633.

132

See Stanley v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 359 Fed. App’x 926 (10th Cir. 2010); Barrash v. Bowen,
846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988); Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., Fla., 650 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. Unit
B July 1981), overruled by Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (1997); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49
F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487 (D. Colo.
1997); McNill v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
133

McNill, 950 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

134

Id. at 566.

135

Id. at 566-67.
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eventually reclassified her title, then demoted her.136 She sued, alleging that her
employer’s actions were discriminatory and related to her breastfeeding.137
The district court considered whether breastfeeding fell within the
meaning of “pregnancy, childbirth, or [a] related medical condition.”138 The
district court, construing the PDA,139 defined the act of giving birth and
pregnancy as the time in which a fetus is gestating in the uterus.140 The district
court concluded, based on this definition that an infant’s cleft palate and lip was
not a condition related to pregnancy or childbirth.141 Delving into the Act’s
legislative history, the court reasoned that the related medical condition must
afflict the mother, not the child, and a cleft palate and lip do not directly affect the
mother.142 Though the plaintiff’s situation was particularly sympathetic, the
district court concluded that she was not part of the protected class and did not
allege a prima facie case for discrimination under Title VII.143
2.

Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc.144

In Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., the plaintiff worked in production at
MSNBC.145 Upon returning from her maternity leave, she chose to use a breast
pump to collect her breast milk when she could not nurse.146 She obtained her
employer’s permission to use her breast pump three times a day for about twenty
136

Id. at 567.

137

Id. at 568.

138

Id. at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted).

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 569-70.

142

Id. at 570.

143

Id. at 571.

144

Martinez, 49 F.Supp.2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

145

Id. at 307.

146

Id.
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minutes per session.147 After a few months, this particular schedule grew more
burdensome, and she sought a more regular schedule.148 The employer, however,
demoted the plaintiff when she could not work the hours required as a
producer.149 The plaintiff filed for and received a right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC to allege that MSNBC had, under the American with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), failed to provided her adequate accommodations to pump her breast
milk and, under Title VII, had engaged in retaliatory conduct by demoting her,
among other claims.150
The Southern District of New York dismissed her ADA claim because
“pregnancy and related medical conditions do not, absent unusual conditions,
constitute a [disability] under the ADA” and noted that one judge in the Second
Circuit stated that, “it is simply preposterous to contend a woman’s body is
functioning abnormally because she is lactating.”151 The court further concluded
that under Title VII, breast-pumping individuals did not merit a protected status;
thus, the plaintiff failed to state a prima facie claim of gender discrimination.152
The court also concluded that the plaintiff was not suffering a hostile work
environment due to her breast pumping because “there were and could be no men
with the same characteristic,” which meant that, at most, it was a “work
environment hostile to breast pumping, not a work environment that subjected
women to treatment less favorable than was meted out to men.”153 The court
found that her retaliation claim failed because Title VII did not cover acceptable
breast pumping facilities and dismissed her complaint.154

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.

150

Id. at 308.

151

Id. at 309 (quoting Bond v. Sterling, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 306, 311 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (McAvoy,
C.J.)).
152

Id. at 311.

153

Id.

154

Id.
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Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc.155

Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc.156 presented a similar outcome. The
plaintiff, a blackjack dealer, took FMLA leave, which was scheduled to end in
June 1994.157 The plaintiff, however, could not return by the scheduled date
because she had not set “an appropriate breast-feeding schedule.”158 A month
after her scheduled return, the defendant fired her.159 The plaintiff filed gender
and discrimination claims with the EEOC and received a right-to-sue letter.160
The District of Colorado Court granted summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s Title VII claim. The court, handling the case on first impression,
determined after looking at the act’s language, the act’s legislative history, and
other courts’ decisions, that neither childrearing nor breast-feeding are within the
PDA’s scope.161 The court surmised that the PDA’s legislative history did not
mandate that an employer provide benefits or accommodations for breastfeeding
to be paid if the condition was not medically related to pregnancy.162
Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiff failed to establish that other
similarly situated employees received different treatment.163 The court stated that
she also failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination because
she submitted no evidence that better conditions were provided to male
employees who took medical leave.164 The court, however, allowed the plaintiff

155

Fejes, 960 F.Supp. 1487 (D. Colo. 1997).

156

Id. at 1489.

157

Id. at 1490.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Id. at 1491.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 1492.

163

Id.

164

Id. at 1492-94.
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to proceed with her FMLA and breach of contract claims, because she provided
specific facts to show that genuine issues of material fact existed.165
4.

Stanley v. Abacus Technology Corp.166

In Stanley v. Abacus Technology Corp., the plaintiff worked for her
employer as a photographer.167 She gave birth, returned to work, and was
terminated four months after her return.168 She received a right-to-sue letter from
the EEOC and sued based on pregnancy and gender discrimination.169 The
district court granted summary judgment for the employer.170
At the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff contended that her employer denied her
the ability to modify her schedule during her pregnancy or breastfeeding period
and gave her a lower performance appraisal during her pregnancy.171 The Tenth
Circuit determined that she had not established an adverse employment action or
that she was treated differently from other employees in similar situations.172 The
plaintiff never requested an accommodation to breastfeed her child during her
lunch hour and could not remember a time when her employer refused to
reschedule a lunchtime assignment.173 Further, other co-workers did not have
165

Id. at 1494-97.

166

Stanley, 359 Fed. App’x 926 (10th Cir. 2010).

167

Id. at 926.

168

Id. at 927.

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Id. at 928.

172

Id. at 928-29. Because the plaintiff did not present any direct evidence of discrimination, the
Tenth Circuit was required to examine her case through the indirect approach using the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell-Douglas. Id. at 928. As a result, the plaintiff had to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination with the following factors: “(1) she [was] a member of a
protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) she was treated differently
from similarly situated employees.” Id.
173

Id. at 928.

2012]

A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR BREASTFEEDING WORKING MOTHERS

223

duty-free lunch hours either.174 The Tenth Circuit also found her retaliation claim
baseless, as she had received a marginal rating in her performance and had
received verbal warnings about her violations.175 Additionally, the plaintiff failed
to explain how the district court erred in its analysis.176 Ultimately, the Tenth
Circuit determined that there was no reversible error in granting summary
judgment on the gender discrimination claim because the plaintiff did not present
evidence of different treatment of similarly situated co-workers, which is
necessary to establish a prima facie case for such claims.177 Thus, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.178
5.

Dike v. School Board of Orange County, Florida179

Dike v. School Board of Orange County, Florida180 presented a deviation
from the previous line of cases. The plaintiff was a kindergarten teacher who
breastfed her newborn, arranging for her spouse or her babysitter to bring the
newborn to school during her breaks and lunch periods to nurse.181 She breastfed
the newborn in a locked room where others could not see and she performed all of
the duties asked of her by the school.182 Citing a school board directive
disallowing teachers from bringing their children to work for “any reason,” the
principal asked her to stop nursing her newborn on school grounds.183 The
plaintiff complied and began using a breast pump to accommodate her child’s

174

Id. at 929.

175

Id. at 929-31.

176

Id. at 930-31.

177

Id. at 931.

178

Id.

179

Dike, 650 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981).

180

Id. at 784.

181

Id. at 784-85.

182

Id.

183

Id.
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allergy to formula milk.184 However, the change in routine affected the plaintiff
and newborn, so the plaintiff requested to either be allowed to resume her old
routine or be allowed to nurse the child off campus when she was not on duty.185
This request was denied.186 The plaintiff was later forced to take a leave of
absence when her newborn refused to nurse from the bottle.187 She sued,
however, the district court denied her request for a preliminary injunction and
dismissed her complaint.188
The Fifth Circuit, determining that the request for a preliminary injunction
was moot because the plaintiff had already begun to wean the child, addressed
only the issue of back pay.189 The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s complaint, deciding that the district court needed additional facts to
weigh the plaintiff’s interests against those of the school board.190 The Fifth
Circuit described breastfeeding as “the most elemental form of parental care” and
a “communion between mother and child that, like marriage, is ‘intimate to the
degree of being sacred.’”191 The court concluded that the Constitution protects a
woman’s decision to breastfeed, like other personal family and marriage
decisions, from excessive state interference.192 The court, however, also
acknowledged that the school board had an interest in preventing disruption of the
educational process, ensuring teachers perform their duties, and avoiding potential
liability.193 The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine

184

Id.

185

Id.

186

Id.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

190

Id.

191

Id. at 787; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).

192

Dike, 650 F.2d at 787.

193

Id.
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whether the school board’s interests merited regulation and were narrowly
drawn.194
6.

Barrash v. Bowen195

In Barrash v. Bowen, the plaintiff worked for the Social Security
Administration and sought six months of maternity leave after the birth of her
second child so she could breastfeed.196 Initially, she only received six weeks of
maternity leave, but she was granted more time after receiving notes from her
doctor.197 Her employer, however, requested that she return to work, and if she
did not return to work, she needed to provide adequate documentation for illness
or would be considered absent without leave.198 After repeated instructions to
return to work and denials of requests for more time, the employer terminated the
plaintiff.199 The review board determined that the discharge was valid, yet the
district court concluded that the policy violated Title VII and awarded her
relief.200
The Fourth Circuit, however, concluded that the review board’s
determination was appropriate.201 After examining the plaintiff’s Title VII claim,
the Fourth Circuit noted that disparate impact analysis was inappropriate because
the grant or withdrawal of the leave was discretionary despite the involvement of
a new mother.202 The Fourth Circuit noted that the number of women receiving
six months of maternity leave was decreasing over the years, and that comparing
the women and men’s leave was not possible because the men were incapacitated
194

Id.

195

846 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1988).

196

Id. at 928.

197

Id.

198

Id.

199

Id. at 929.

200

Id.

201

Id. at 930.

202

Id. at 931.
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and the women were not.203 The Fourth Circuit determined that any disparate
impact regarding the leave policy was not of the kind that would invalidate the
policy, because it did not show that women received less favorable treatment than
men.204 The court then noted that the unpaid leave of absence policy concerned
the excessiveness of the leave and disparate impact could not be shown by
information that was unaffected by the directive.205 The Fourth Circuit reversed
the judgment of the district court.206
PART IV: SURVEY OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS
Women have certainly made strides since the enactment of the Nineteenth
Amendment, but opportunities for further progress remain. Allen and the other
similar cases mentioned demonstrate how perceptions of women, pregnancy, and
the workplace from the days of General Electric and Geduldig persist in some
form.
A.

Breastfeeding Statutes

Twenty-four states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have
addressed breastfeeding and the workplace.207 Though these statutes vary in their
accommodation of breastfeeding women, they tend to fall into two categories: (1)
allowing employees to take unpaid breaks to express breast milk that run
203

Id. at 931-32.

204

Id. at 932.

205

Id.

206

Id.

207

Breastfeeding Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncls.org/issues-research/health/breastfeeding-state-laws.aspx (last visited July 28,
2010). The states that have addressed breastfeeding and the workplace are as follows: Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. Id. Forty-five states (including
Ohio), the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands allow breastfeeding in any public or
private location. See id. (listing states). Other states exempt breastfeeding from public indecency
laws, exempt breastfeeding women from jury duty, or create a public awareness campaign on
breastfeeding. See id. (listing states).
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concurrently with those breaks already provided by the employer or (2) allowing
employees to express breast milk during meal or break periods.208 Most statutes
do not require employers to provide these break if doing so would unduly disrupt
their operation.209 As such, even if Ohio enacted a statute similar to those in other
states, the Allen court likely would have reached the same result due to the
plaintiff taking unauthorized breaks.210 Most of these statutes indicate that
breastfeeding should occur during breaks or concurrent with breaks.211
Ohio could, however, model its laws after states that are more
accommodating to breastfeeding in the workplace. Colorado requires employers
to provide reasonable unpaid break time or allow the employee to use paid break
or meal periods to express breast milk for up to two years after the child’s birth.212
Oregon requires employers to provide breastfeeding employees with a half-hour
break for every four-hour shift, unless a different agreement is reached.213 If an
208

Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-116(a) (2009) (providing employees with “reasonable
unpaid break time” to express breast milk, which should run concurrently with any paid or unpaid
breaks already provided); CA. LAB. CODE § 1030 (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6(b) (2008)
(same) 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 260/10 (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.939 (same); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 435 (2008) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-305(b) (2008) (same) with
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40w(a) (2008) (allowing breastfeeding on meal or break periods);
IND. CODE ANN.§ 5-10-6-2 (requiring state and its political subdivisions to provide paid breaks for
employees to express breast milk which should run concurrently with the employee’s already
provided breaks); and MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-1-55 (2008) (barring employers from preventing
employees from breastfeeding during provided meal or break periods).
209

See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6(b) (allowing employers to provide no breaks if the breaks would
unduly disrupt operations); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 435 (same); and TENN. CODE ANN. § 501-305(b) (2008) (same).
210

ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-5-116(a) (2009) (providing employees with “reasonable unpaid break
time” to express breast milk which should run concurrently with any paid or unpaid breaks already
provided); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40w(a) (2008) (allowing breastfeeding on meal or break
periods).
211

Id.

212

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-13.5-104(1) (2008); see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 604 (2009)
(requiring employers to provide reasonable unpaid breaks or allow the employee to use paid
breaks for up to three years after the child’s birth); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 206-C (2007) (same).
213

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.077(1)(c) (2008).
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employer wants to promote itself as infant- or mother-friendly in North Dakota,
Texas, or Washington, it must comply with certain standards of workplace
flexibility by scheduling breaks and patterns for expressions of milk, private areas
to pump, areas to clean pumping machines, and storage areas for the milk.214
These accommodations need not coincide with established breaks. Most of these
accommodations, however, are voluntary for employers; only Oregon has
mandated that employees receive half-hour breaks for every four hours worked.215
Although voluntary, these arrangements show that some states value their female
citizens ability to be both employees and mothers.
The aforementioned examples of state legislation indicate that some states
are trying to promote workplace equality. One way to resolve these differing
standards among the states is to amend the PDA. In 2005, Representative
Maloney of New York introduced a bill to amend the PDA and meet the needs of
women with infants, a growing segment of the labor force, to reflect the
recommendations of the American Academy of Pediatrics to breastfeed for the
first six months of an infant’s life. 216 In addition, the bill asserted that courts’
exclusion of breastfeeding from the meaning of the PDA was inconsistent with
congressional intent.217 The bill, if it had been enacted, would have given
employers tax credits for providing dedicated areas for breastfeeding.218 This bill,
however, failed to pass that year219 or during the 110th220 or during the 111th
Congress. 221

214

See S.B. 2344, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2009) (listing requirements to be designated an
infant-friendly employer); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.003(a) (2008) (listing
requirements to be designated a mother-friendly employer); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.70.640(1) (2008) (listing requirements to be designated as an infant-friendly employer).
215

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 653.077(1)(c) (2008)(noting that failure to comply can result in a
thousand dollar penalty).
216

Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendments of 2005, H.R. 2122, 109th Cong. § 102(a)(1),(3)
(2005).
217

See id. § 102 (a)(8)-(9).

218

Id. §§ 201, 451.

219

The bill was referred to a House subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations in May
2005. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
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Congress, however, has made progress with the passage of Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“PPACA”). Section 4207 of the
PPACA requires employers to provide a clean and private area and unpaid breaks
for mothers to express breast milk.222 Although the act applies only to “a fraction
of U.S. workers,”223 it provides coverage to working mothers in the states who
have not addressed breastfeeding in the workplace.224 Additionally, the section
does not preempt a state’s coverage if the state provides greater protection than
the federal law.225 Although the PPACA represents progress for working
bin/bdquery/d?d109,d109:100:./temp/~bdDOeQ:[[o]]&items=100&|/bss/d109query.html| (last
visited on Feb. 8, 2010); see http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h1092122&tab=committees (last visited on Feb. 8, 2010) (showing the various committees that the bill
had been referred to including House Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Energy and
Commerce subcommittee on Health, House Education and Workforce, and the Employer
Employee Relations subcommittee). Since the bill was not passed and occurred in a previous
congressional session, the bill was cleared from the books and would need to be reintroduced.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2122 (last visited on Feb. 8, 2010).
220

http://maloney.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1337&Itemid=61
(last visited on Feb. 8, 2010). The bill was reintroduced on May 9, 2007.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas (last visited on Feb. 8, 2010). The bill was referred to
another House subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions.
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/thomas. It was not enacted and would have to again be reintroduced.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2236 (last visited on Feb. 8, 2010).
221

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d111:1:./temp/~bdjeRG:@@@X|/bss/d111query.html| (last visited on Feb. 8,
2010). The bill was referred to the House Ways and Means Committee, the Energy and
Commerce Committee, and the House Education and Labor Committee.
222

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 4207 (2010). This section amends § seven of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2010).
223

United States Breastfeeding Committee, Workplace Accommodations to Support and Protect
Breastfeeding, 9-10, available at
http://www.usbreastfeeding.org/Portals/0/Publications/Workplace-Background-2010-USBC.pdf.
Thus, employers with less than fifty employees are not subject to the law if the requirements
would “impose an undue hardship by causing the employer significant difficulty and expense” in
relation to the employer’s business. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 4207(r)(3).
224

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 4207.

225

Id. § 4207(r)(4).
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mothers, the act has just survived several constitutionality challenges and still
must face questions and issues arising with implementation.226
B.

The “Mommy Wars”

In addition to limited statutory protection, media and society have
contributed to discrimination against working mothers through the “mommy
wars”227 by speculating as to whether women could have it all.228 Despite women
balancing work and family, the media has spotlighted a recent trend of women
“opting out” of their careers to be stay-at-home mothers.229 This dynamic likely
shapes employers’ perception of working mothers,230 which may result in a
“mommy tax” (i.e. depressed earnings over the life of the working mother’s
career).231 Thus, working mothers often earn less than women without children,

226

Lyle Denniston, Don’t Call It a Mandate – It’s a Tax, SCOTUSblog
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=147879(last visited on Dec. 27, 2012); see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (U.S. 2012).
227

DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 4, at 204.

228

LESLIE BENNETTS, THE FEMININE MISTAKE: ARE WE GIVING UP TOO MUCH 149 (2007)
(stating that media coverage “focuse[s] obsessively on the logistical challenges of [juggling work
and motherhood without] exploring the rewards”); see also id. at 33, 180-81.
229

Id. at 33, 180-81. This trend, however, is often available only to those families who are
economically able to have one parent at home. See id. at 36 (“To the extent that there are women
who are opting out, they are married to men earning over [$200,000] a year and working [90]
hours a week. High-income men are married to their jobs, not their families, and that’s who these
women who are being written about are married to.”).
230

DOUGLAS & MICHAELS, supra note 4, at 208 (noting that this tension “perpetuated the
stereotype that child rearing was strictly a woman’s responsibility” and that it suggested “that deep
in their hearts, mothers with careers were finding it all too stressful and, if given a choice, would
quit in a heartbeat.”).
231

ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE
WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 87-88. Even though this penalty affects both genders, the
penalty disproportionably affects women as they are often the primary caretakers. Id. at 99
(noting that men who share domestic responsibilities also suffer an economic penalty as they earn
20% less than men who share no domestic responsibilities).

2012]

A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR BREASTFEEDING WORKING MOTHERS

231

and if a woman postpones having children until later in life, her earnings will be
greater over her lifetime.232
A woman who chooses to or must keep working may face some economic
penalty and will struggle to find affordable high-quality child care. Unlike
several European countries, the United States does not supplement the costs of
child rearing.233 Among women who need daycare, two-thirds receive some form
of care from relatives, friends, or neighbors while others use daycare centers,234 as
past attempts to provide national child care have failed.235 Thus, these competing
concerns motivate some women with means and opportunity to stay at home.236
Women who “opt-out” must consider the risk of becoming economically
dependent on their significant others237 or the scarcity of positions if and when
they return to the workforce.238
232

Id. at 94, 103. Overall, the pay gap has been reduced between the sexes, but this reduction
appears only to apply to a discrete group. See id. at 87 (noting that women make ninety-eight
cents to a man’s dollar but this figure only applied to the group of women between the ages of
twenty-seven and thirty-three with no children). If all working women are compared to men, then
they earn about 59% of men’s wages. Id. at 93.
233

Id. at 104. France provides about $10,000 in subsidies to families with two preschool age
children. Id. Additionally, Swedish women receive a year’s paid leave after they have given
birth, as well as a government stipend for child care expenses and a right to a six-hour work day
with full benefits until their child attends elementary school. Id. at 108.
234

Id. at 243.

235

See id. at 244-45. The United States almost enacted a Comprehensive Child Development Act
in the 1970s, which would have provided child care to all children, but it was vetoed. Id.
Attempts to reintroduce and enact this bill have failed. Id. at 346-49. Then in the 1980s, the
federal government reduced funding for children by 18%. Id. at 249.
236

BENNETTS, supra note 219, at 36.

237

See id. at 47 (noting that few women considered the loss of their income and dependency on
their spouse or partner in reaching their decision to opt-out).
238

See id. at 77 (noting that two-thirds of women who opt-out to raise children and want to reenter the working world find the situation very difficult). Only 74% of those seeking involvement
in the professional world rejoin it. However, only 40% have a full time professional job while
24% have a part time job and 9% are self employed. Id. at 78. Women with “elite credentials”
often have the most difficult time returning to the workplace, and even if they return, they will
suffer a loss of earning power. See id. at 78-79 (noting that women lose about 18% of their
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Such considerations may subconsciously affect courts addressing PDA
cases. Although Allen did not have to reach the breastfeeding issue because Allen
took unauthorized breaks, the court’s opinion indicates that courts still have a
narrow view of pregnancy and the workplace. If a female employee had morning
sickness and took unauthorized bathroom breaks, would she be terminated?
Although impossible to predict, this example demonstrates the subtlety necessary
to address the needs of lactating employees.
The difference in treatment of pregnant women and new mothers also
presents an issue. An employer that terminated an employee suffering from
morning sickness would likely be sued for violating the PDA.239 Legislative
history has not clarified why breastfeeding lacks the PDA’s protection though;
like morning sickness, lactation arises from a hormone produced “in response to
the birth of a new baby.”240 According to the definition, lactation (and as a result,
breastfeeding) should be a “related medical condition” to pregnancy because it
stems from the pregnancy and is triggered by childbirth. However, as previously
demonstrated above, courts disagree with this analysis. This divergence indicates
that women in different stages of life have different levels of protections in the
workplace.
This subtle divergence may cause women to worry about their choices
between breastfeeding and using formula. The American Academy of Pediatrics

earning power by opting out and with three or more years, they can lose up to 37% of their earning
powers).
239

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (stating that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit otherwise.”); see
also MEDTERM.COM, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=13406 (defining
morning sickness as “nausea and vomiting of pregnancy,” which “is a normal characteristic of
early pregnancy”) (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
240

MEDTERM.COM, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=6202 (defining
lactation) (last visited Oct. 22, 2012).
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encourages breastfeeding for the first six months,241 and opting for the latter may
create several hurdles.242 Thus, in making this decision, women must consider
their workplace. Does the office have a breastfeeding policy? Will they have to
seek permission to breastfeed from their employer? Do they risk taking
unauthorized breaks and face possible termination? These and other
complications, may cause women to determine that opting out of the workplace
during the initial years of their child’s life is the path of least resistance especially
if they have the financial means to do so.243 By opting out, these situations and
issues will remain unaddressed and future generations will face the same issues.
Furthermore, legislation addressing breastfeeding and the workplace
shows some progress. With the PPACA surviving its constitutionality challenges,
it will provide a minimum baseline; however, it will now face forthcoming
questions of implementation for reliability.244 To ensure that all women receive
protection, states should model any future legislation after Oregon’s laws related
241

American Academy of Pediatrics, AAP Reaffirms Breastfeeding Guidelines, (Feb. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/pages/AAP-ReaffirmsBreastfeeding-Guidelines.aspx?nfstatus=401&nftoken=00000000-0000-0000-0000000000000000&nfstatusdescription=ERROR%3a+No+local+token.
242

Roni Rabin, Breast-Feed Or Else, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2006, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E1DC1331F930A25755C0A9609C8B63&pa
gewanted=1 (noting that a U.S. Senator has proposed placing warning labels on infant formulas
and feedings of guilt by mothers who could not breastfeed their children); Jennifer Zajfe,
Formula, for Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/13/opinion/nyregionopinions/13CIzajfe.html (noting that
hospitals in some states have stopped providing formula samples in order to promote breastfeeding
and arguing that hospitals and government should allow mothers to make the decision regarding
how their child receives sustenance).
243

Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html?pagewanted=all (noting many
professional women are opting out of the workforce to take care of children).
244

See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (U.S. 2012); see also David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear,
House Votes for Repeal of Health Law in Symbolic Act, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2011 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/health/policy/20cong.html?_r=1&hp (stating that the House
of Representatives supported the repeal with a vote of 245 to 189 and that “Leaders of the
Democratic-controlled Senate have said that they will not act on the repeal measure, effectively
scuttling it”).
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to breastfeeding and the workplace. In addition, employers should consider
implementing a policy to counter future litigation as well as for their own bottom
line.
CONCLUSION
Women still struggle for equality. Women have the right to vote, hold
jobs that were once exclusively reserved for men, and have more choices than in
previous decades. However, women still face obstacles in the workplace from
salary disparity245 to pregnancy discrimination.246 Moreover, breastfeeding is still
not protected under the PDA.
Women are often viewed as mothers and wives first, before considering
what other valuable and important roles they can fulfill. However, most women
likely want to be perceived as more than just a wife or mother. They want to be
perceived in their totality not just in their separate and various roles. Like the
suffragists before them, women must raise these issues with their elected officials,
courts, employers, and spouses or significant others to raise awareness and
promote change, so they can spur their state legislatures into drafting legislation
to improve their situations. If they find that their elected official cannot or does
not support their cause, they can exercise the right to vote in support of rights and
officials that will assist in creating a more fair environment and provide for more
choices in that environment, including but not limited to the choice to breastfeed
(or not) in the workplace.

245

Jennifer Ludden, Despite New Law, Gender Salary Gap Persists, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO, Apr. 19,
2010, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125998232 (discussing
gender salary gap and possible legislation to resolve pay inequity).
246

Julie Manning Magid, Pregnant with Possibility: Reexamining the PDA, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 819,
821 (stating that complaints rose by six percent between 1997-99). The number of receipts filed
for pregnancy discrimination decreased from 2008 to 2009. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges,
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). In 2008,
6,285 receipts were filed while in 2009, only 6196 receipts were filed. Id. This decline could be
due to less discrimination or it could be a result of the worsening economy and employee layoffs.
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